



# ARCHIVES OF AUTHORITY

Empire, Culture, and the Cold War

ANDREW N. RUBIN

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## Archives of Authority

# t r a n s l a t i o n

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# Archives of Authority

EMPIRE, CULTURE, AND  
THE COLD WAR

*Andrew N. Rubin*

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*In memory of Edward W. Said*

# Contents

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<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1	
Archives of Authority	11
<i>The Archive and the Juridical</i>	12
<i>States of Exception</i>	13
<i>States of Criticism</i>	17
CHAPTER 2	
Orwell and the Globalization of Literature	24
<i>Communist Crypts</i>	28
<i>The “Communist Menace”</i>	34
<i>The Translation of Authority</i>	37
<i>Translation and Modes of Domination</i>	44
CHAPTER 3	
Transnational Literary Spaces at War	47
<i>The Sun Never Sets on the British Writer</i>	47
<i>The Time of Translation</i>	58
<i>London Calling</i>	60
<i>Literary Diplomacy</i>	65
CHAPTER 4	
Archives of Critical Theory	74
<i>Accommodations</i>	80
CHAPTER 5	
Humanism, Territory, and Techniques of Trouble	87
<i>Terrain of Philology</i>	90
<i>Notes</i>	109
<i>Bibliography</i>	141
<i>Index</i>	167

## Archives of Authority

I used to marvel that the letters in a closed book did not get mixed up and lost in the course of night.

—*Jorge Luis Borges*

IN MAY 2000, I wrote what was to be the first of several letters to the Central Intelligence Agency and requested, under the Freedom of Information Act, that it release all available information in its possession about the English poet Stephen Spender (1909–95). While I had no hard evidence proving that Spender was an intelligence agent, I was confident that he had played a direct role in the various institutions that emerged in the early years of the Cold War. From 1953 to 1967, Spender had served as the co-editor of *Encounter* magazine—the flagship journal published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. One of the most significant institutions in the Cold War, the CCF was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency to essentially administer, control, and manage the various discourses of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

When I submitted the request, I did so on the basis of an emerging body of scholarship that examines the relationship between American postwar ascendancy and “cultural diplomacy” in the early years of the Cold War and decolonization.<sup>2</sup> While much of the existing research focuses on how the U.S. government, through the CCF, funded symphonies, performances, musical competitions, literary prizes, exhibitions, festivals, and many scholars and writers,<sup>3</sup> few studies have considered how its underwriting reshaped and refashioned the global literary landscape, altered the relationships between writers and their publics, and rendered those whom it supported more recognizable figures than others.<sup>4</sup> While many of these endeavors arose in the absence of a defined cultural strategy to legitimize American postwar ascendancy,<sup>5</sup> these practices were nevertheless conceived as part of an orchestrated imperial effort to occupy a global public space that by 1948 had been largely dominated by the socialist rhetoric of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).

In 1948, a National Security Directive (NSC-10) authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to develop a cultural strategy to undermine the Soviet Union’s “peace offensive,” and shortly thereafter, the CCF became one of the most important projects and institutions in the imperial rivalry between the two superpowers. Through any number of its journals—*Cuadernos*

(published in Paris but distributed in Latin America from 1956 to 1965), *Cadernos Brasileiros* (published in Rio de Janeiro from 1959 to 1970), *Encounter* (published in London from 1953 to 1974), *Forum* (published in Vienna from 1954 to 1965), *Der Monat* (published in Munich from 1949 to 1971), *Preuves* (published in Paris from 1951 to 1975), *Quadrant* (published in Sidney from 1956 to 1967), *Quest* (published in Mumbai from 1955 to 1976), *Tempo Presente* (published in Rome from 1956 to 1967), and *Transition* (published in Kampala from 1961 to 1967)—the CCF had a significant impact on the changing conditions of humanistic practice from 1950 until 1967, when the *New York Times* and *Ramparts* magazine reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had been secretly funding the CCF, along with its exhibitions, performances, poets, novelists, theater companies, dancing troupes, and student associations. All these energies and resources, it was revealed, were enlisted to legitimize and culturally sustain the transfer of imperial power from Europe to the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War and refashion and reinvent the idea of world literature.

#### THE ARCHIVE AND THE JURIDICAL

When I submitted my Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in the spring of 2000, I expected that the response to the inquiry would supply a complete account of the process of selection, inclusion, and exclusion that governed the congress's cultural strategy, particularly as it related to *Encounter* magazine, of which Spender was the more influential and older coeditor (above Irving Kristol). I had hoped that such information, if released, would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the intertwining of culture and power in the early years of the Cold War and decolonization. The full disclosure of the relationship between the CCF and the U.S. government would not only explain how new techniques and modes of articulation had radically redefined the position of public writers in postwar culture but would also reveal which writers were selected for marginalization, how they were chosen, and why. We know very little, for example, of the CCF's efforts to discredit and delegitimize writers such as Pablo Neruda, John Berger, Frantz Fanon, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Did this absence of a positive cultural strategy extend to other writers? The endeavor also addressed a larger shift in global alignments and accommodations: the cultural strategies that were part of the transfer of imperial authority from Britain and France to the United States in the aftermath of World War II, the history of which has been largely overlooked.<sup>6</sup> Mapping the whole network of relationships, assemblages, and organizations that constituted the CCF's endeavors would establish the conditions for the development of new forms

of nondominative knowledge, just as it would document the historical conditions through which *Weltliteratur's* silences are deposited. Because Stephen Spender was an editor of *Encounter*, and quite an itinerant one at that, my request thus focused on him as much as it aimed to acquire knowledge about what one might call the concealed *institutional and disciplinary mechanisms of dominant culture*, the better to be able to grasp the historical determinants of its archive.<sup>7</sup>

Several months after I made the inquiry, the agency requested that I provide evidence that Stephen Spender was, in fact, no longer alive. Shortly after submitting his obituary from the *New York Times*, I received a brief letter from the agency indicating that it would “neither confirm nor deny” the “existence or nonexistence” of any available information on Stephen Spender for reasons of “national security.”<sup>8</sup> The decision did not come as a complete surprise, but it seemed alarming that the cultural policies carried out shortly after the Second World War could conceivably remain classified half a century later. The Berlin Wall had fallen in November 1989, the Soviet Union no longer existed, and a whole new way of thinking had replaced the episteme of the Cold War. The intricacies of the CIA’s involvement in international and domestic cultural politics and the origins of the CCF had been made public by *Ramparts* magazine in 1966 and then by the *New York Times* in 1967.<sup>9</sup> Intelligence officials such as Tom Braden had already written and spoken openly about the CIA’s administration of the CCF. In a strident, unapologetic defense, whose underlying irony seemed to escape him, Braden wrote:

I remember the enormous joy I got when the Boston Symphony Orchestra won more acclaim for the U.S. in Paris than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches. And then there was *Encounter*, the magazine published in England and dedicated to the proposition that cultural achievement and political freedom were interdependent. Money for both the orchestra’s tour and the magazine’s publication came from the CIA, and few outside the CIA knew about it. We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another agent became an editor of *Encounter*.<sup>10</sup>

#### STATES OF EXCEPTION

The CIA based its refusal to comply with my request upon its interpretation of the National Security Act of 1947, which had established the Central Intelligence Agency. The act held that the CIA was not required to confirm the existence of any material that could possibly reveal its “sources

and methods” of collecting intelligence.<sup>11</sup> The act stipulated that the CIA, unlike other government agencies, such as the Security Exchange Commission or the Department of Labor, was exempt from releasing any material that could be “reasonably” construed “to result in damage to national security”:

The Central Intelligence Agency can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of any Central Intelligence Agency records responsive to your request. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of records containing such information—unless it has been officially acknowledged—would be classified for reasons of national security under Sections 1.5 (c) [intelligence sources and methods] and 1.5 (d) [foreign relations] of Executive Order 12958. Further, the Director of the Central Intelligence has the responsibility and authority to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with Subsection 103 (c) (6) of the National Security Act of 1947 and Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949. . . . By this action, we are neither confirming nor denying the existence or nonexistence of such records.<sup>12</sup>

In a challenge to the government’s decision in the spring of 2001, I filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York, claiming that the agency had improperly withheld information about Spender in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. Given the historical nature and the obscurity of the query, I thought I stood a relatively strong chance of persuading the court of the importance of the request. Why, after all, should a scholar of English literature have to enjoin the government to release historical texts about a deceased British poet? The casistry of the government’s position seemed, to me at least, extraordinarily transparent, and I assumed that any reasonable judge would concur that the government had withheld information from the public in violation of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Freedom of Information Act was codified as a federal law in 1966. Later amended in the 1970s shortly before the Church Committee hearings disclosed the scope and ruthlessness of the CIA’s various operations abroad (the then secret overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran, Chile, and the Congo; the attempted assassinations of Jawaharlal Nehru and Fidel Castro; the failed ouster of Sukarno in Indonesia; and the fixing of Italy’s elections of 1948, among other activities),<sup>13</sup> the Freedom of Information Act provides access to U.S. government records, documents, cables, texts, decisions, and memoranda.<sup>14</sup> Yet, as a statute that regulates the release or suppression of official forms of knowledge, the law contains nine provisions through which the government is exempt from upholding the general spirit of the law. In my case in particular, the agency contended that the law could be suspended in the interest of upholding national security.<sup>15</sup>

The agency invoked two exemptions, claiming the information remained classified for reasons of national security and that revealing that information would disclose procedures and sources of intelligence that the director of the CIA has the responsibility to protect under the National Security Act.<sup>16</sup> The first exemption, based on an executive order issued by then president Bill Clinton, held that the information was classified because the very fact of its “existence or nonexistence” was itself classified. The agency was therefore permitted to “refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or nonexistence is itself classified under Executive Order 12,958.”<sup>17</sup> The second exemption was based on the principle that the disclosure of the information—whose “existence or nonexistence” it had already insisted would undermine “national security” under Clinton’s executive order—was the responsibility of the director of the CIA, who had a duty to “protect [such knowledge] from unauthorized disclosure.” In other words, the language of the act emphasized that the director is charged with the obligation to prevent any *unauthorized* acts of disclosure—an action that he and only he can authorize. If this reasoning suggested that the National Security Act required that the director has the duty to protect its records, it also implied that the very act of releasing them belongs to a class of unauthorized disclosures that have simply escaped the director’s attention.

The relationship between these two exemptions raises questions that are relevant to understanding the mechanics of power. To begin with, how can information that belongs to the realm of “nonexistence” be protected? What kind of power can claim authority over both the nonexistent and the existent? While there is a rationale to protecting sources and methods from unauthorized acts of disclosure, how can the director prevent the disclosure of nothing at all? What, if anything, is there to protect, if there is nothing but a void? What kind of authority organizes itself in this zone of indifference? Is the power to neither affirm nor negate what it may possess or may not possess a power that suggests that all forms of knowledge might possibly be under its control? Or instead of revealing the possible scope of this power, might it reveal something more about the nature of power upon which the state relies? Is the *indeterminacy* of the archive the absence or void upon *which state power rests*, since it is not simply a matter of the suspension of the law itself but *the concealment of a zone of indifference* that has become the very condition of possibility of authority in the first place?<sup>18</sup> Much like Kafka’s character in “Before the Law” who wants to enter the law but cannot be assured for himself that there is a law behind the series of guarded doors to begin with, the only law visible to him is the demand to remain *before* it.<sup>19</sup>

In November 2001, the Federal District Court in New York did not question the legitimacy of the exemption or the logic of the relationship

between the two exemptions or its application. Deciding in favor of the agency's motion to dismiss my case, the court maintained that the agency had compelling reasons to protect the "appearance of confidentiality," which was "essential" to exercise United States authority abroad.<sup>20</sup> The Federal District Court determined that the CIA had provided a "reasonably detailed explanation" as to why it refused to either confirm or deny "the fact of the existence or nonexistence" of records germane to the request. In spite of the fact that whatever activities Spender may have engaged in or been a part of happened half a century ago, the Federal District Court affirmed that the agency had complied with the dictates of the Freedom of Information Act. The court held that "the CIA has offered reasonable explanations for why the disclosure of such information could interfere with Agency efforts to collect human intelligence in the present day, including its 'compelling interest' in 'protecting the appearance of confidentiality' so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."<sup>21</sup>

The Federal District Court based its decision on a series of precedents that reinterpreted the National Security Act of 1947, which maintains that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency is obliged to "protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." As the district judge observed in the decision, the Supreme Court in *CIA v. Sims* had radically extended and reinterpreted the scope of the National Security Act. In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the National Security Act as giving the agency "very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure."<sup>22</sup> If the National Security Act of 1947 originally gave the director of the CIA the responsibility to prevent "unauthorized disclosures," in *CIA v. Sims*, the Supreme Court broadly expanded that authority to include the protection of "*all sources* of intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure" (my emphasis), regardless of the information's level of classification, without defining precisely who or even what a "source" is.<sup>23</sup>

Citing the precedent, the District Court concluded that the government met its responsibility to "protect" its sources and methods from "unauthorized disclosure," claiming that its "sources" were further governed by a zone of indifference: "the existence or nonexistence" of the documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act. Not only is the Freedom of Information Act subject to a state of exception, but knowledge—which the state has the authority to "protect from disclosure"<sup>24</sup>—does not even have to exist for the exception to be invoked and enforced. The metaphysics of national security therefore rests on an ambivalence: to identify an "intelligence source" would be to reveal the methods that are used to determine whether a source is a source or not—itself a violation of the authority

vested in the director of Central Intelligence.<sup>25</sup> We are thus far from enjoying the free, open, and democratic dissemination of information,<sup>26</sup> but are close enough to be able to see the actual meaning of the authority of the state and the archives of its authority.

#### STATES OF CRITICISM

The cultural process by which imperial authority was transferred from Britain and France to the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War has received very little attention in the various discussions of American culture and imperialism. The transfer of legitimacy did not simply involve the passage of imperial power from one topos to another. Instead, an entire reconfiguration of cultural relationships took place that had vast consequences for the position of the writer in society, the conditions of humanistic practice, the ideology of world literature, and the relationship between writers and the rising dominance of new and efficient modes of mass transmission. By the early 1950s, the changing conditions of literary production that the CCF oversaw had essentially become a global process, not simply of cultural reproduction but of cultural replication. While the sources of the CCF's funding were unknown to its contributors (like Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, W. H. Auden, Daniel Bell, Albert Camus, Cyril Connolly, Leslie Fiedler, Robert Lowell, Christopher Isherwood, Karl Jaspers, Cecil Day-Lewis, Arthur Koestler, Edwin Muir, Herbert Read, Lionel Trilling, and others), the activities of the CCF permitted their work to travel in unlikely, unexpected, and influential ways. Through its array of journals, surprising juxtapositions between writers such as Thomas Mann and Juan Rulfo were often repeated with regularity in any number of their journals, sometimes simultaneously, to the extent that their status as world authors became regulated and normalized in the different iterations of their writing.

The articulation of discourses of “democracy” and “cultural freedom” involved a set of disciplinary mechanisms and practices that placed the texts of Auden, Arendt, Camus, Faulkner, Koestler, Silone, Wright, and others in an assemblage of publications in several languages simultaneously—in Arabic, English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and Spanish. In this way, the CCF and organizations like it reconstituted the conditions of humanist practice. It consolidated and reframed writers' associations and affiliations; it secured some reputations; it tried to ruin others;<sup>27</sup> it upheld an illusion of the literary world outside of politics; it certified figures;<sup>28</sup> and it gave them tremendous visibility. The CCF and other institutions effectively used the cultural world as a kind of disguise that certified that specific

public writers were permitted to politically engage in a social system from which others were implicitly—and at times explicitly—excluded.

In the early years of the Cold War, British and American writers and intellectuals were sent abroad to diverse and unlikely places; their articles were juxtaposed with the articles of writers of different nationalities, ranging from German (Thomas Mann) to American (William Faulkner), from French Algerian (Albert Camus) to Russian British (Isaiah Berlin), and from British (Kingsley Amis) to Polish (Czesław Miłosz). From this conjuncture of new and emergent cultural forces arose an entirely new and powerful episteme that was irreducible to the antinomies of the Cold War—and often seen as a ceaseless war of rhetoric between totalitarianism and democracy. This new organization of knowledge had effects that were multiple, vast, and global. They included numerous government institutions and organizations that promoted art exhibitions, dance performances, symphonies, writers' congresses, and scholarly conferences, which brought about a tectonic shift in the intellectual culture that followed the Second World War. New forms and modes of articulation, reproduction, and replication accompanied these developments. Of all the forms that were widely available to create a profusion of opportunities, radio was one of several modalities of transmission that dramatically altered the relationship between writers and their audiences. With the cultural expansion of radio, audiences were no longer spoken to directly; instead, writers spoke via microphones to audiences. Audiences no longer listened. Instead the microphone did the listening, and the radio speakers delivered the conditions of hearing the voice of the disembodied writer.<sup>29</sup>

After the cessation of hostilities in World War II, the postwar world underwent a massive shift in cultural and intellectual terrain, with the development of newer and more efficient modes of articulation, duplication, and transmission that restructured the relationship between the writer and the public. The imperatives of new global alignments—the emergence of nearly one hundred decolonized states after World War II—brought about a major shift in the emphasis of the study of languages and literatures.<sup>30</sup> Disciplines were partitioned, divided, and separated into *areas of study*, even before the National Defense Education Act of 1958 constituted “Area Studies.”<sup>31</sup> Managed and administered by new types of periodicals of culture and politics, by new orders of literary organization and affiliation, the discourse of cultural freedom provided innumerable opportunities for the persistent enforcement and reinforcement of dominant structures of attitude and reference, ideas ultimately bereft of variety, diversity, and history. New international alignments and accommodations brought about the personification of nations: “our friends” and “our brothers.” Complex conceptions about the social reorganization of life were likely to “spread,”

according to George Kennan, at the behest of the “Kremlin.”<sup>32</sup> Writers and critics no longer traveled for the sake of experience or to promote their books, but at the behest of organizations such as the British Council or the CCF. Their coordinated movements constituted different, wider, unknowable audiences, while writers became recognizable outside the domestic national spaces to which they and their work had for the most part been confined. Indeed, it was not until after the war that Cyril Connolly’s journal *Horizon* (1940 to 1949) published an “all-American issue.”

Often presented by the faceless figure of the Western observer writing home, as if always by hand, to share his or her personal but generalizable experience of social life abroad, “Letters from London,” “Letters from Moscow,” and “Letters from Kenya” gained currency as one of several generic conventions through which the “foreign” was represented, assimilated, and disseminated with greater and greater frequency. The shifting technical developments in transmission realigned the conventions of Orientalism toward the discourse of development and modernization. There was no dearth of essays in *Encounter* with titles such as “Looking for India,” “Letter from Norway,” “At Vecherinka,” “A Sentimental Traveler in Japan,” and “World Cities: Calcutta.”<sup>33</sup> It was then, with the emergence of monthly journals such as *Encounter*, that the pressures of form and economy further accelerated the disappearance of the little magazines of modernism. Other developments ensured the synchrony, symmetry, and duration of thought. Journals and magazines were drop-shipped transnationally with greater velocity by air. Writers working in faraway places were read at new proximities in both time and place. New means of reproduction and replication overcame geographic distances. In “Marrakech,” a text George Orwell published in *New Writing* in 1939, he wrote, “When you walk through a town like this—two hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom at least twenty thousand have nothing but rags they stand up in—when you see how people live, and still more easily how they die, it is always difficult to believe that you are still walking among human beings.”<sup>34</sup>

Translated, distributed, reproduced, and, in the case of more abbreviated forms, replicated in multiple languages nearly simultaneously, the new monthlies, such as *Cuadernos*, *Encounter*, *Der Monat*, *Preuves*, *Tempo Presente*, and others inaugurated a new historical phase of writing: the essay form from abroad became a mode of social and political analysis in a world whose productive and massively destructive forces diminished the value of the category of human experience and restructured the passage of time to an always imminent state of emergency, while a rhetoric remained radically discrepant with the actual lived realities and experiences of human beings. The titles of the magazines were allegorical: Britain had to face the new terms of *Encounter*, in Paris they needed *Preuves*, Italy was returned to the

present (*Tempo Presente*), in Mexico writers filled up their notebooks (*Cuadernos*), in Berlin they kept track of the months (*Der Monat*) of Soviet and American occupation, and Africa was in *Transition*.

Spheres of influence, barbed wires, airlifts, zones, crypto-communists, fellow-travelers, the bomb, covert actions, propaganda, neutralism, non-alignment, free world, un-American activities, Sputnik, arms race, peace dividend—a whole new battery of language and rhetoric refigured one of the most seemingly incurable imperial rivalries, whose violent effects and actual human and environmental devastation were experienced and endured in the Third World, as Vijay Prashad has shown in *The Darker Nations*.<sup>35</sup> New vocabularies of imaginary geographies arose. Out of Asia came “areas”; terrains were spatialized by new signals of distance and orientation; “Middle East,” “Southeast Asia,” “South Asia,” and “East Asia” replaced the “Near East” and the “Far East.”

The emergence of governmental and nongovernmental institutions—the British Council, the CCF, the United States Information Agency, the Information Research Department (IRD; a secret division of the British Foreign Office), the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations—had historically decisive effects on the relationship between the public writer and his or her audience. These new cultural formations that mobilized writers to unpredictable places abroad not only fundamentally reconstituted the relationship between the writer and their public but redefined the very modes of domination, subjugation, and subordination. No longer the object of imperial desire, the physical occupation of territory was replaced by the occupation of literary and cultural space.<sup>36</sup> A global public space had replaced the physics of colonial presence; the public space had to be saturated by signals that were interchangeable with the new cultural order.

The chapters that follow will demonstrate how the emergence of and cooperation between organizations such as the IRD, the CCF, the British Council, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations served a critical function that constituted new patterns of administration and dominance. They will show how, in the face of the development of organized movements for national independence and liberation, America’s postwar ascendancy involved the development of new strategies and methods to suppress and eliminate dissent. The spread of different forms of mediation—the growing transnational importance of radio and the writers’ presence on programs such as the BBC’s *Third Programme*; the global expansion of the British Council; the appearance of new types of journals of culture and politics (*Perspectives USA* and *Encounter*); the emergence of new strategies and techniques of duplicating translations that accompanied these practices; and the changing realities facing the public writer, whereby certain writers acted as cultural emissaries abroad—were, I argue, among the efficient modalities that became the altered basis of humanistic and literary prac-

tices in the early years of the Cold War. The following chapters will also show how so-called world writers were subjected to new regimes of consecration and authorities that arbitrated the recognition of some authors over others. Revising Pascale Casanova's claim that an international literary law emerged that owed nothing to political fiat, this book interrogates this claim by analyzing an archive of relations between authors and the interrelated cultural activities of the British and American empires.<sup>37</sup> Viewing these relations as an analyzable formation, I argue that this archive of relations places new kinds of critical demands on the practice of literary historiography, particularly in the framework of the present.

The five chapters of the book and the twelve sections into which the book is divided are intended to facilitate an exposition of the changing basis of humanistic practice after World War II. If this chapter summarizes the dimensions of the subject both in terms of historical time and the dimensions of the subject, and in terms of its major philosophical and political themes of the archive, chapter 2, "Orwell and the Globalization of Literature," traces the development of specific postwar modalities of transmission that articulated, adapted, translated, and recontextualized Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *Animal Farm* in order to describe a set of devices and techniques that gave a new momentum to transnationalization of Orwell's works. Chapter 3, "Transnational Literary Spaces at War," characterizes the new relations and circumstances that writers experienced after the Second World War by emphasizing the emergence of what were not simply the new modes of literary "reproduction" but new and increasingly efficient modes of "literary replication"; that is to say, a faster, more efficient, increasingly instantaneous and synchronic practice of translation, whereby an essay by T. S. Eliot might appear next to a short story by Jorge Luis Borges, not only in one single language in one single monthly but also in several languages in several monthlies. The nearly instantaneous translation of texts by George Orwell, Thomas Mann, W. H. Auden, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Czesław Miłosz, Stephen Spender, Richard Wright, Mary McCarthy, and Isaiah Berlin, among others, into interrelated journals— *Encounter* (London), *Der Monat* (Berlin), *Preuves* (Paris), *Tempo Presente* (Rome), *Quadrant* (Sydney), *Transition* (Kampala), *Black Orpheus* (Lagos), *Jiyu* (Tokyo), and *Hiwar* (Beirut)—effectively transformed writers, critics, and intellectuals into easily recognizable, transnational figures while excluding alternative figures of particularity and dissent. I underscore the importance of the emergence of new forms of mediation that radically transformed and reoriented the relationship between writers and their publics in the interstices of the Cold War and decolonization, and elaborate on, for example, how radio broadcasting was not simply a relatively new mass mode of reproduction and one-way transmission but also a way of securing and establishing the authority, visibility, and recognition of

intellectuals, public writers, and literary movements in this decisively new and historical phase of literary, cultural, and humanistic practice. The purpose of this analysis is certainly not to reduce these generic and formal effects to the endeavors of the organizations, governments, foundations, and institutions that I examine, nor is it to say the government completely administered cultural life, but rather it is to focus on what has until now been a mostly unexamined cultural and literary terrain that underwent enormous changes in the years immediately following the Second World War.

Chapter 4, “Archives of Critical Theory,” returns to the subject of the political archive by examining the FBI’s surveillance of Theodor Adorno and the rhetorical codes subsequently registered in texts such as Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, both of which were written in exile. By placing an equal and related stress on the context of the surveillance of Adorno and the logics involved in Adorno’s aversion to empirical radio research and his critique of empiricism and positivism in general in the context of his exile in the United States, I highlight the political constraints on Adorno’s thought in the domestic context of anticommunism in order to emphasize that the discourse of cultural freedom advanced abroad was part of an interrelated process of censorship and surveillance at home. Having drawn on Adorno’s work, in chapter 5, “Humanism, Territory, and Techniques of Trouble,” I argue that Adorno advances a critical model that serves as the basis for Edward Said’s negatively dialectical view of a humanism that is rooted in philology. It is in this view of humanism that I finally identify what makes *Archives* a work of investigational literary historiography that is critical to challenging the epistemological limits of the archives of authority that increasingly define the conditions of modernity.

What is being proposed in this book is the thesis that these institutional relationships between intellectuals and the state, as well as its related institutions, had a profound effect not only on the identity of a corpus of cultural work but also, as Edward Said observed in *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, on the basis of humanist praxis. Although the government did not fully program cultural life, much of the work that was promoted abroad was the object of anticommunist hysteria and censorship at home.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, there is a decisive shift in the way that the idea of *Weltliteratur* was conditioned, not only by the relationships between a group of intellectuals and the institutions of anticommunism but also by the development of transnational modes of communication, translation, and transmission, which fundamentally altered the basis of literary and cultural production. If the government’s manipulation of the cultural archive has partially prohibited the critical examination of the relationship between culture, the state, and humanistic practice, the responsibility of the critic and the intel-

lectual is nothing less than the demand for democracy, for democratic criticism. This does not mean, as Alain Badiou has suggested, maintaining a distance from the state.<sup>39</sup> To the contrary, the place of power is empty, captured by the CIA's refusal to "neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence" of the traces of its power. By revealing the gap between the emptiness of this power and the authority that exercises its hold on the void, the following chapters provide a symptomatic account of the relays of power in order to give us a better understanding of its function in the interstices of the Cold War and decolonization.

33. Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Boulder, 1985).

34. Slavoj Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (New York: Verso, 2010), 474.

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5. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World*, 24.

6. See Said, *Orientalism*, 275; Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 64–65, 243; John Carlos Rowe, “Edward Said and American Studies,” *American Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2004): 33–47; Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); and Bruce Cumings, *Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 389.
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8. Kathryn Dyer, Central Intelligence Agency, Information Privacy Coordinator to the author, June 28, 2000.
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15. 50 U.S.C. § 195 (2010) (formerly 50 USC § 195) (formally § 40) (2010). Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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18. Agamben, *State of Exception*, 23.
19. Franz Kafka, *The Complete Stories*, trans. Nahum Glatzer (New York: Schocken, 1995).
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21. *Ibid.*
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26. See Jonathan Hafetz, "Secret Evidence and the Courts in the Age of National Security: Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits of Secrecy in Detentions at Guantanamo," *Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal* (Fall 2006): 127–69.

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32. George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 575; also see Nikhil Pal Singh, "Cold War Redux: On the 'New Totalitarianism,'" *Radical History Review* 85 (2003): 174.

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35. Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008).

36. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 324.

37. Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters*, 11–12.

38. At the same moment the U.S. government was exporting its modern art to Europe, Congress was eager to censor its exhibition at home. As Jane de Hart Mathews writes, "With the closely reasoned rhetoric so characteristic of conspiratorial thinking, George Dondero [Republican chairman of the House Committee on Public Works] argued that modernism had been used against the Czarist government when Trotsky's friend, Wassily Kandinsky, had released on Russians 'the black knights of the isms': cubism, futurism, dadaism, expressionism, constructionism,

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39. Alain Badiou, “‘We Need a Popular Discipline’: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of the Negative,” *Critical Inquiry* 34, no. 4 (2008): 649.

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3. Raymond Williams, *Politics and Letters* (London: New Left Books, 1979), 384.

4. *Ibid.*

5. James Miller, “Is Bad Writing Necessary? George Orwell, Theodor Adorno, and the Politics of Literature,” *Lingua Franca* (December/January 2000): 12–18; Judith Butler, “A ‘Bad Writer’ Writes Back,” *New York Times*, March 20, 1999, A15; and Cleo McNelly, “On Not Teaching Orwell,” *College English* 38 (1977): 553–66.

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